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Abstract. Creative information exploration refers to a novel framework
for exploring large volumes of heterogeneous information. In particular,
creative information exploration seeks to discover new, surprising and
valuable relationships in data that would not be revealed by conven-
tional information retrieval, data mining and data analysis technologies.
While our approach is inspired by work in the ﬁeld of computational cre-
ativity, we are particularly interested in a model of creativity proposed
by Arthur Koestler in the 1960s. Koestler’s model of creativity rests on
the concept of bisociation. Bisociative thinking occurs when a problem,
idea, event or situation is perceived simultaneously in two or more “ma-
trices of thought” or domains. When two matrices of thought interact
with each other, the result is either their fusion in a novel intellectual
synthesis or their confrontation in a new aesthetic experience. This arti-
cle discusses some of the foundational issues of computational creativity
and bisociation in the context of creative information exploration.
“Creativity is the defeat of habit by originality.” – Arthur Koestler
1 Introduction
According to Higgins, creativity is the process of generating something new that
has value [19]. Along with other essentially human abilities, such as intelligence,
creativity has long been viewed as one of the unassailable bastions of the hu-
man condition. Since the advent of the computer age this monopoly has been
challenged. A new scientiﬁc discipline called computational creativity aims to
model, simulate or replicate creativity with a computer [7]. This article explores
the concept of bisociation [20] in the context of computational creativity. While
our discussion may be relevant to a large number of domains in which creativ-
ity plays a central role, we emphasize domains with clear practical applications,
such as science and engineering. We start our discourse on bisociation with the
familiar concept of association.
The concept of association is at the heart of many of today’s powerful computer
technologies such as information retrieval and data mining. These technologies
typically employ “association by similarity or co-occurrence” to locate or discover
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information relevant to a user’s tasks. A typical feature of these approaches is that
the underlying information pool (document corpora, databases, Web sites, etc.)
contains information that has been pre-selected in some way to focus and simplify
the discovery process. For example, a biological study would pre-select scientiﬁc
papers from relevant life science journals or abstracts before applying a particular
text mining task. Pre-selecting information in this way already introduces certain
limits on how creative these conventional approaches can be. This means that un-
der normal circumstances such resources would not be combined to facilitate cre-
ative insights and solutions. A novel information exploration paradigm that aims
to facilitate the generation of creative insight or solutions could be referred to as
creative information exploration (CIE ). Domains were CIE is critical include de-
sign and engineering, the arts (e.g., painting, sculpture, architecture, music and
poetry) as well as scientiﬁc discovery disciplines.
In the remainder of this article we use the terms creative domains and creative
disciplines to designate domains and disciplines in which creative information
discovery plays an important role.
People working in creative domains employ creative thinking to connect seem-
ingly unrelated information, for example, by using metaphors, analogy and other
ways of thinking and reasoning [6]. Creative styles of thought allow the mixing
of conceptual categories and contexts that are normally separated. Our goal is
to develop computer-based solutions that support creative thinking. Inspired
by Koestler’s notion of bisociation [20], our particular aim is to develop con-
cepts and solutions that facilitate bisociative CIE tasks in creative domains.
Intuitively, bisociative CIE could be viewed as an approach that seeks to com-
bine elements from two or more “incompatible” concept or information spaces
(domains) to generate creative solutions and insight.
The remainder of this article is organized as follow: Sections 2 and 3 introduce
a working deﬁnition of creativity with a view to its computational realization.
In Sections 4 to 6 we review Kostler’s notion of bisociation and oﬀer an initial
formal deﬁnition of this concept. Before we reﬂect on the work presented in this
article and oﬀer some concluding remarks (Section 8), we present a short review
of related work in Section 7.
2 Creativity
2.1 What Is Creativity?
Human creativity, like other human capabilities, is diﬃcult to deﬁne and formal-
ize. In this article we adopt the following working deﬁnition of creativity based
on the work by Margaret Boden [6].
Definition 1 (creativity). Creativity is the ability to come up with ideas or
artifacts that are new, surprising, and valuable.
In this working deﬁnition of creativity the notions of idea and artifact refer to
concepts and creations from art as well as science and engineering and other
areas. Here we view creativity as an ability which is an intrinsic part of an
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intelligent agent (human, machine-based or otherwise). In the following discus-
sion we elaborate the meaning of the concepts new, surprising and valuable in
the deﬁnition of creativity.
The word new in our working deﬁnition of creativity may refer to two dimen-
sions: historic creativity or personal creativity. By historic creativitywemean ideas
or artifacts that are original in the sense that they represent the ﬁrst occurrence of
a particular idea or artefact in human history. The history of science and modern
legal practice tell us that sometimes it may not be straightforward to determine
precisely the ﬁrst occurrence of a scientiﬁc or engineering idea. Examples of dis-
putes over historic creativity include the theory of evolution, the invention of gun
powder, and the social Web site Facebook. Personal creativity, on the other hand,
means that someone comes up with an idea or invention independently from some-
one else who had already conceived of the same thing before. From the perspective
of the “re-inventor” this still constitutes “true” creativity.
An important factor in our working deﬁnition of creativity concerns the notion
of surprise – for a new idea to be considered creative there has to be an element
of surprise. An idea or artefact may be surprising because it is unlikely (has a low
probability of occurring) or unfamiliar.When a new idea unexpectedly falls into an
already familiar conceptual framework (or thinking style) one is intrigued to not
have realized it before. For example, in 1996Akihiro Yokoi invented a “digital pet”
called Tamagotchi which soon became a best seller. While the concept of looking
after plants, pet animals and soft toy pets has been around for a long time, no one
had dared to think that this idea could be applied to devices that resemble digi-
tal pocket calculators. A diﬀerent type of surprise occurs when we encounter an
apparently impossible concept or artefact. For instance, in 1905 Einstein shocked
the scientiﬁc establishment by suggesting that energy is being transmitted in ﬁ-
nite “packets” called quanta [11]. Max Planck, the originator of quantum theory,
initially rejected Einstein’s proposal even though his own theory suggested that
energy transfer to and from matter is not continuous but discrete.
The last element in our working deﬁnition of creativity is the notion of value –
a new concept or artefact must be valuable in some non-trivial way to qualify as
creative. In the ﬁne arts aesthetic values are diﬃcult to recognize or agree about:
what makes a painting by one artist hundred times more expensive than a paint-
ing by another? To formally deﬁne aesthetic values is even harder. Furthermore,
values vary over time and within and across cultures. Even in science there is of-
ten considerable disagreement over the “simplicity”, “elegance” or “beauty” of a
theory or scientiﬁc argument. Einstein and Bohr, for instance, had argued over
decades about the value (correctness and completeness) of the two prevailing
models of the atom (the probabilistic and discrete model, favored by Bohr, and
the deterministic and continuous model, which was preferred by Einstein) [22].
Whether a particular hypothesis is interesting or valuable may depend on sci-
entiﬁc, social, economic, political and other factors. So even when we agree on
novelty and the factor of surprise, there may still be a considerable disagreement
over how valuable a new idea or artefact is, hence over the degree of creativity.
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This brief discussion about the nature of creativity and the diﬃculty to rec-
ognize and agree on what creativity actually is serves as a context for the de-
velopment of computational creativity techniques. Ultimately, what constitutes
human or machine creativity is diﬃcult to judge and needs to be assessed on a
case-by-case basis.
2.2 Three Roads to Creativity
Following Boden [6] we distinguish three processes of creativity; these relate to
the three forms of surprises discussed above.
Combinatorial Creativity. Arthur Koestler1 is credited with the following
characterization of creativity:
The creative act is not an act of creation in the sense of the Old Testa-
ment. It does not create something out of nothing; it uncovers, selects, re-
shuﬄes, combines, synthesizes already existing facts, ideas, faculties, skills.
The more familiar the parts, the more striking the new whole.
This idea is very much in line with the ﬁrst process of creativity identiﬁed by
Boden, which generates unfamiliar combinations of familiar concepts and con-
structs. In humans, analogy is a fundamental cognitive process in which familiar
elements appear in an unfamiliar arrangement. A typical example of analogy
establishes an analogical relationship between Niels Bohr’s model of the atom
with the basic structure of the heliocentric solar system. Facilitating this kind
of creative process requires a rich knowledge structure and ﬂexible ways of ma-
nipulating this structure. Clearly, the novel combination of elements must have
a point or a meaning. Therefore, purely random shuﬄing and re-combination of
elements will not be suﬃcient to generate creativity.
Exploratory Creativity. Margaret Boden deﬁnes conceptual spaces as a
“structured style of thought”. In her deﬁnition, a key characteristic of concep-
tual spaces is that they are not originated by an individual but are a structure
adopted from the cultures and peer groups within which people live [6]. Concep-
tual spaces include ways of writing prose, styles of architecture and art, theories
of nature, as well as approaches to design and engineering. So any systematic
way of thinking which is valued by a certain group or culture could be thought
of as a conceptual space.
In Boden’s framework, a conceptual space deﬁnes a space of possible combi-
nations of its elements, where each combination represents a particular thought,
idea or artifact. While the number of possible thoughts within a conceptual
space may be very large, only a fraction of these may have actually been real-
ized. Consider, for instance, the games of chess and checkers. In chess the number
of possible legal positions or “conﬁgurations” has been estimated at 1015 790 and
for checkers the number is 1018 [16,29]. Clearly, even with the long history of
chess playing, only a very small number of possible “combinations” could have
1 Proliﬁc writer and author of The act of creation [20].
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been explored so far. Clearly, Boden’s concept of a conceptual space is much
broader. For the game of chess, for example, it would not only include all possible
chess board positions but also all knowledge structures employed by chess players
to play the game as well as other facts and information about chess.
No matter what the actual size of a given conceptual space, someone who
comes up with a new combination within that space is considered to be creative
in the exploratory sense (provided the combination “has a point”). Boden likens
the exploration of conceptual spaces to the exploration of a territory with a map.
The map encompasses all possibilities, but to discover a particular and valuable
possibility one needs to go out and explore the actual territory. Exploratory cre-
ativity is important as it facilitates the discovery of so far unknown possibilities.
Once such novel possibilities come to light, the explorers may even be able to
reﬂect deeper on the limits and potentials of a particular conceptual space.
Transformational Creativity. Exploratory creativity is limited by the possi-
bilities deﬁned within a conceptual space or thinking style (or “map”). Essen-
tially, each conceptual space restricts the kind of thoughts that can be thought.
To overcome this limitation, and to attempt to think what is unthinkable within
a given conceptual space, it is necessary to change or transform the conceptual
space. It must be transformed so that thoughts that were inconceivable within
the previous version of the space now become possible. Such transformations
may be subtle or radical. Transformational creativity constitutes the deepest
form of creative processes in Boden’s model of creativity.
3 Computational Creativity
Teaching humans to be creative is a ﬂourishing business and the number of cre-
ativity techniques available is large [19]. Teaching or programming a computer to
be creative or appear to be creative is another matter altogether. Computational
creativity refers to an active scientiﬁc discipline that aims to model, simulate or
replicate creativity using a computer [7].
Computational creativity draws on many concepts developed within the ﬁeld
of artificial intelligence (AI ). Analogously to computational creativity, AI could
be deﬁned as a discipline aiming to model, simulate or replicate (human) intel-
ligence. Boden suggests that AI concepts could be used to deﬁne and construct
artiﬁcial conceptual spaces which could then be studied and eventually be used
to combine elements from the spaces, and to explore and transform such spaces
with the aim of generating creative insight and solutions. Boden describes con-
crete AI-based approaches to computational creativity [6,7].
4 Koestler’s Concept of Bisociation
People working in creative domains employ creative thinking to connect seem-
ingly unrelated information (true negatives under the association paradigm), for
example, by using a metaphoric or analogical way of thinking. Analogical and
metaphoric styles of thought allow the mixing of conceptual categories and
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contexts that are normally separated. In the 1960s Arthur Koestler developed a
model of creative thinking referred to as bisociation [20]. Bisociation facilitates the
mixture in one human mind of concepts from two contexts or categories of objects
that are normally considered separate by the literal processes of the mind.
Koestler proposed the bisociation concept to distinguish the type of
metaphoric thinking that leads to the acts of great creativity from the more
“pedestrian” associative style of thinking, with which we are so familiar in our
everyday lives and which pervades many of todays computing approaches. As-
sociative thinking is based on the “habits” or set of routines that have been
established over a period of time. Associative processes combine elements from
the same “matrix” of thought. The associative mode of thinking diﬀers from
the bisociative mode that underlies the creative act. Bisociation, according to
Koestler, means to join unrelated, often conﬂicting, information in a new way.
It is being “double minded” or able to think simultaneously on more than one
plane or matrix of thought (see Figure 1). “When two independent matrices
of perception or reasoning interact with each other the result ... is a ... fusion
in a new intellectual synthesis ...” [20]. Frank Barron reinforces this idea and
characterizes bisociation as “the ability to tolerate chaos or seemingly oppo-
site information” [3]. Koestler makes a clear distinction between more routine
or habitual thinking (association) operating within a single plane or matrix of
thought, and the more creative bisociative mode of thinking which connects
independent autonomous matrices.
Koestler’s basic concept of bisociation is illustrated in Figure 1. The diagram
depicts two matrices of thought (domains or knowledge bases in our terminol-
ogy), M1 and M2, as orthogonal planes. M1 and M2 represent two self-contained
but “habitually incompatible” matrices of thought. An event, idea, situation,
concept or problem, π, which is perceived simultaneously in both matrices is
not merely linked to one associative context (M1 or M2) but bisociated with
two associative contexts (M1 and M2). In the diagram, π is illustrated by the
thick line cutting across M1 and M2. The diagram illustrates six concepts la-
beled c1, . . . , c6. The concepts c1, c2, c3 and c6 are perceivable in matrix M2 and
c1, c2, c3, c4 and c5 are perceivable in M1. The concepts c1, c2, c3 are associated
with the problem π – because c1, c2, c3 are perceivable in both matrices, it is
possible to “see” the problem simultaneously from two frames of mind.
Central to Koestler’s concept of bisociation are the notions of a matrix and a
code Koestler [20]; we quote from page 38:
... to introduce a pair of related concepts which play a central role
in this book and are indispensable to all that follows. ... I shall use the
word ‘matrix ’ to denote any ability, habit, or skill, any pattern of ordered
behavior governed by a ‘code’ of ﬁxed rules.
A matrix2 in Koestler’s framework denotes any ability, skill, habit or pattern of
ordered behavior. Matrices shape our perceptions, thoughts, and activities; they
2 Other terms Koestler uses for the concept of a matrix include the following: matrix of
thought, matrix of behavior, matrix of experience, matrix of perception, associative
context, frame of reference, universe of discourse, type of logic, code of behavior.
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Matrix / Knowledge Base: M1










Concept as perceived within M2
Legend:
Concept as perceived within M1
Problem perceived 
simultaneously 
in M1 and M2
Fig. 1. Illustration of Koestler’s concept of bisociation (adapted from Koestler [20])
could be viewed as condensations of learning into “habit”. For example, a spider
has an innate skill that enables it to build webs, a mathematician possesses the
ability of mathematical reasoning, and a chess grandmaster has a knowledge
base which allows him to play chess at a very high level. The abilities and skills
represented by a matrix may be applied to concrete problems and tasks in a
ﬂexible way. For example, depending on the environment a spider ﬁnds itself in,
it may choose three, four or more points of attachment to suspend its web.
Each matrix in Koestler’s model of bisociation is governed by a set of ﬁxed
codes or rules. The rules could be innate or acquired. For example, in the game of
chess, the rules of the game are ﬁxed, while the patterns of knowledge (allowing
one to play well or not so well) vary across players3. In mathematics, operations
such as multiplication, diﬀerentiation, integration, etc. constitute ﬁxed rules that
govern mathematical reasoning. Another example of a code are the assumptions,
concepts, notions, etc. that underly religious, political, economic, philosophical
and similar debates and arguments. For instance, a debate on abortion may be
held “in terms of” religious morality or social responsibility. Often the rules that
govern a matrix of skill (ability, habit) function on a lower level of awareness than
the actual performance itself (playing the piano, carrying out a conversation,
formulating a strategy).
Once people have reached adulthood they have formed more or less rigid,
automated patterns of behavior and thinking (“habits” or knowledge bases).
Sometimes these patterns are interrupted by spontaneous sparks of insight which
presents a familiar concept or situation in a new light. This happens when we
connect previously unconnected matrices of perception or experience in a creative
act of bisociation. Considering the ﬁeld of humor, science and engineering as well
as the arts, Koestler’s conjecture was that bisociation is a general mechanism
3 Certain ways of playing chess are also relatively frequent or nearly constant. For
example, certain moves in chess openings, or certain endgame patterns.
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for the creative act. When two habitually independent matrices of perception
or reasoning interact with each other the result is either a collision ending in
laughter, or their fusion in a new intellectual synthesis, or their confrontation in
an aesthetic experience [20].
Koestler provides numerous examples and illustrations ofhis bisociation concept
indiﬀerentareasanddomains. In the followingwebrieﬂy summarize theArchimedes
example which Koestler refers to as the “Eureka act” (Figure 2). The Eureka act is
concerned with the discovery of solutions to a more or less scientiﬁc problem.
Archimedes, a leading scientists in classical antiquity, was taskedwith the prob-
lem of determining whether a crown (a present for Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse) con-
sisted of pure gold orwas adulteratedwith silver.To solve this problemArchimedes
needed tomeasure the volume of the crown.At the timenomethod existed to deter-
mine the volume of such an irregularly shaped three-dimensional object. Pondering
over this problem, Archimedes’s thoughts wandered around his matrix of geomet-
rical knowledge (Figure 2a). One day, while taking a bath, Archimedes noticed the
rise of thewater level as his body slid into the basin. Itwas at this pointwhenhe con-
nected the matrix of and experience associated with taking a bath with the matrix
of his knowledge of geometry. He realized that the volume of water displaced was
equal to the volume of the immersed parts of his own body. This Eurekamoment is
illustrated in Figure 2b.WhenArchimedes found the solution to this problemboth
matrices (associations of taking a bath and knowledge of geometry) were simulta-
neously active. In a sense Archimedes was looking at the same problem from two
diﬀerent perspectives of knowledge or experience at the same time. This “double-
mindedness” allowed him to see the solution which was obscured under the view of
either of the two individual perspectives.
Consider the diagram in Figure 2a. The dashed line illustrates Archimedes’s
search through the conceptual space to ﬁnd a solution for his problem. While
the search path traverses both knowledge bases (M1 and M2), the reasoning
of Archimedes is initially conﬁned to perceiving only one knowledge base at a
time. Thinking about the problem in this “habitual” way, Archimedes fails to
“see” the solution, because he does not simultaneously perceive the concepts
describing the solution (c1 and c6) and the problem (c1, c2 and c3).
Now consider the diagram in Figure 2b. At some point Archimedes is able
to perceive the concepts describing both the problem (P ) and the solution (S)
simultaneously from the perspective of both knowledge bases. This is depicted
by the line connecting the corresponding concepts across both knowledge bases.
It is at this point when Archimedes experiences the Eureka moment which is
created by the bisociative view spanning two matrices of thought.
The example of Archimedes and the crown illustrates how a familiar but un-
noticed aspect of a phenomenon (rise of water level as a result of the immersion
of an object) is suddenly perceived at an unfamiliar and signiﬁcant angle (deter-
mining the purity of substance of an irregularly shaped object). Koestler refers
to this as the “bisociative shock” often associated with discoveries when we
suddenly see familiar objects and events in a strangely new and revealing light.
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Concept as perceived withinM2
Legend:
Concept as perceived withinM1
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Eureka act (adapted from Koestler [20]). The matrix or
knowledge base M1 represents concepts or associations of geometrical knowledge, and
M2 those of taking a bath. The dashed lines represent the search or exploration of
the matrices as part of the problem-solving process. (a) Diagram on the left: The
line connecting the concepts c1, c2 and c3 represents the problem, P , as perceived
by Archimedes based on his geometric knowledge base M1. The arc connecting the
concepts c1 and c6 in M2 represents the solution, S. (b) Diagram on the right: The
concepts associated with the problem and solution when perceived simultaneously in
both knowledge bases.
The distinguishing characteristics of associative and bisociative thought are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of characteristics of bisociation and association based on
Koestler [20]
Habit (Associative) Originality (Bisociative)
association within a given matrix bisociation of independent matrices
rigid to ﬂexible variations on a theme super-ﬂexibility
repetitiveness novelty
conservative destructive-constructive
5 Elements of Bisociative Computational Creativity
Before we formally deﬁne bisociation, we analyze and compare the concepts and
models of creativity proposed by Boden and Koestler. We do this by adopting
an AI perspective of the notions involved and, on this basis, attempt a synthe-
sis. In essence, we deﬁne creativity and bisociation in terms of domain theories
and knowledge bases. Simply put, a domain theory consists of all knowledge
(concepts) relevant to a given domain (at a given point in time), regardless of
the type of knowledge, how it is encoded (formalism, substrate) or where it is
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located. Under this deﬁnition of a domain theory, a knowledge base is simply
a subset of all the concepts in a domain theory. However, diﬀerent classes of
knowledge bases may be distinguished.
Concept. A concept denotes a cognitive unit of meaning which is sometimes
referred to as “unit of knowledge”. Concept descriptions are constructed from
concept properties (features, dimensions) [30]. A concept is normally associated
with a corresponding representation or encoding in a particular language or
formalism. Concepts form the basis for the cognitive abilities of an intelligent
agent. Without a concept, an intelligent agent or reasoner, relying on a mem-
ory containing a potentially large number of items, would be hopelessly lost.
If a reasoner perceived each entity as unique, it would be overwhelmed by the
enormous diversity of what it experiences, unable to remember but a fraction of
what it encounters. A concept captures the notion that many objects, ideas or
events are alike in some important respects, and can therefore be thought about
in the same or similar ways. Once an entity has been assigned to a concept on
the basis of its perceptible properties, a concept may also be used to infer some
of the entity’s non-perceptible attributes. Having, for example, chosen percepti-
ble attributes like size, shape and material to decide an object is a book, it can
be inferred that the object contains pages and textual information. This idea
of inferability is based on the assumption that all instances of a given concept
are subject to the same, or similar, underlying mechanisms (e.g., cause-eﬀect
relationships) which may or may not be completely known. Such mechanisms
may be simple, in the case of books, or complex in chess positions.
Diﬀerent views and models of concepts have been proposed [30]; these vary
in a number of aspects, in particular, in the degree to which they are determin-
istic/probabilistic and intensional/extensional. In this article, concepts form the
basic units from which domain theories and knowledge bases are constructed.
Here, concepts include all forms of knowledge, including the three kinds of knowl-
edge normally distinguished in epistemology: “knowledge that” (propositional,
declarative knowledge), “knowledge how” (procedural knowledge) and “acquain-
tance knowledge” (about places, situations, cases, experiences) [1]. The knowl-
edge that concepts represent may be tacit or explicit, it may be implemented on
living tissue, electronic structures, paper or any other substrate. Critical for our
discussion on domain theories and knowledge bases is that concepts are normally
associated with one or more domains.
Notice that here we do not diﬀerentiate the representation languages or for-
malisms used to specify concrete knowledge structures (frames, rules, trees, net-
works, heuristics, case bases, etc.).
Domain Theory. For the purpose of this discussion, a domain is viewed as
a formal or common sense topic, subject area, ﬁeld of interest, for example, a
scientiﬁc discipline (e.g., biology), a game (e.g., chess), social, cultural, economic
or political topics (e.g., religious morality), common patterns of activity (e.g.,
taking a bath), and so on. Based on this view of a domain, we deﬁne a domain
theory as follows:
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Definition 2 (domain theory). A domain theory Di defines a set of concepts
(knowledge units) that are associated with a particular domain i.
Notice that a particular concept may belong to more than one domain theory
at the same time.
In this view of a domain theory it is easy to see that most domain theo-
ries would be formed from an heterogeneous and distributed pool of knowledge
“sources”, including humans, documents, electronic systems, and so on. For ex-
ample, the domain theory of chess would be “encoded” in books, reports of
tournaments, databases, chess programs, and the minds of a large number of
chess players. While many of the concepts within the domain theory of chess
would be shared across many chess players, other concepts may be unique to
and accessible by individual players only (or by groups of players)4.
A domain theory is shared across a peer group. One consequence of the dis-
tributed and heterogeneous nature of most non-trivial domain theories is that
they are usually associated with a particular peer group, culture, society, etc.,
rather than with an individual or a very small group of people. Notice, a domain
theory, as it is deﬁned here, usually includes elements that are not accessible
by the entire peer group associated with it. For example, the subjective case
base (acquaintance-knowledge) a particular chess master has accumulated over
his career is not likely to be accessible by other chess masters (members of the
peer group). Likewise, certain documents or electronic resources about chess
knowledge may be accessible only to a limited group of peer members.
A domain theory is fixed or changing only very slowly. An established domain
theory would normally not change radically but remain relatively stable and
undergo mostly minor modiﬁcations over time. Radical changes of a domain
theory would be related to changes in fundamental concepts of a domain theory.
For example, nowadays in chess it rarely happens that a “standard” move in a
particular game would be shown to be unsound.
A domain theory incorporates “hidden” concepts. At a given point in time, a large
database holds facts and patterns that have already been explicitly reported or
are known by at least one intelligent agent. However, at the same time there may
be many “hidden” facts or patterns contained in the same database which have
not been discovered yet. Analogously, a domain theory captures concepts which
are explicitly documented or known by an intelligent agent. At the same time,
a domain theory harbors concepts which are yet to be discovered. Notice that
while the total number of hidden and explicit/known concepts within a domain
theory may be very large (or even inﬁnite), not every conceivable concept may
be expressible under the constraints of a particular domain theory.
KnowledgeBase. A knowledge base is constructed from the concepts of a domain
theory; we deﬁne a knowledge base as a subset of a domain theory as follows:
4 Detailed psychological studies suggest that, for example, the number of symptom-
illness correspondences known by a medical specialist, or the number of board posi-
tions memorized by a chess master, appear to be in the range of 30 000 to 100 000 [23].
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Definition 3 (knowledge base). A knowledge base Ki is defined as a subset
of a domain theory Di, i.e., Ki ⊆ Di.
This means that in the extreme case a knowledge base and a domain theory could
be identical. This is of course only a theoretical possibility, because for real-world
domain theories, a knowledge base is normally a highly selective subset of the
domain theory. In particular, a knowledge base would tend to have the following
characteristics.
A knowledge base is domain-specific. As a consequence of how a knowledge base
is deﬁned, it is always deﬁned with respect to a particular domain. Hence, a
knowledge base contains only concepts from the underlying domain theory.
A knowledge base is focused, selective, goal-oriented, biased ... A knowledge
base is normally not formed by a random process which selects elements from a
domain theory and puts them together to make up a knowledge base. Instead,
a knowledge base is either intentionally constructed or it is evolved, and as
a consequence a knowledge base normally represents a focused, selective, goal-
oriented, biased, subjective, etc. subset of the domain theory. When a knowledge
base is designed, its construction is guided by the function it is supposed to
fulﬁll, by other design constraints and requirements, and by the set of biases,
skills, abilities, etc. of its designers. In this process particular choices are made
in terms of which concepts from the underlying domain theory will be included
in the knowledge base. When an intelligent agent acquires knowledge (learning,
evolution) it normally does so under a set of constraints, including the goals it
pursues, its prior experience, abilities, skills, the environment it operates in, and
so on. A knowledge base which is thus constructed or evolved has selected (or
acquired) a set of domain concepts in a very biased or “habitual” way. Notice,
as an intelligent agent evolves a knowledge base, it does not only assimilate
knowledge from the domain theory that is shared by other peer members, but
it also creates a part of the domain theory space that is normally not accessible
to other peer members of the domain.
Agent-specific knowledge bases. In our deﬁnition of a knowledge base, a book on a
particular variant of the Sicilian Defence could be considered as a knowledge base
in the domain of chess. Often, however, in this discussion we are concerned with
knowledge bases that are tied to or integrated within a speciﬁc intelligent agent5.
In this case, we are talking about the type of knowledge base which is highly
subjective, containing domain concepts which are not shared with the domain’s
peer members. It is precisely the non-shared concepts in such an agent-speciﬁc
knowledge base that form a kind of “inertial system” or “reference system”
against which the common or shared parts of the knowledge base are viewed
and interpreted. What is important to understand is that an intelligent agent
has exactly one knowledge base for a given domain! This knowledge base may be
5 Here we use the term “intelligent agent” to denote a uniquely identiﬁable entity with
cognitive abilities such as reasoning, planning, hypothesizing, etc. It is irrelevant on
which physical substrate such an entity is implemented or whether or not it is highly
localized in physical space.
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empty, if the agent knows no concept in that domain, or it may be a non-empty
knowledge base consisting of shared and non-shared concepts of the domain
theory. The non-shared domain concepts impose a unique, biased perspective of
the agent on the domain. The fact that an agent captures part of the domain
theory which is normally not shared with other agents in the domain, makes
such an agent-speciﬁc knowledge base special.
Agent-specific knowledge bases are habitually incompatible. Another critical aspect
of the concept of an agent-speciﬁc knowledge base is that, given a concrete problem,
normally (or “habitually”) only a single knowledge base would be active at a given
time. This is what Koestler refers to as “habitually incompatible” matrices.
Models of Creativity. Both Boden and Koestler base their models on a corpus
of domain-speciﬁc knowledge or concepts called conceptual space by Boden and
code by Koestler. In our conceptualization both a code and a conceptual space
are viewed as a domain theory.
With respects to Boden’s model of creativity, domain theories are equivalent
to the notion of conceptual spaces. They satisfy the characteristic of not be-
ing tied to an individual as well as being relatively stable over time. Indeed, a
domain theory encompasses all the knowledge (or concepts) known about a do-
main at a given point in time. Furthermore, a domain theory represents Boden’s
“generative structure” [6] that contains the “possibilities” of hitherto unknown
knowledge which may be discovered in the creative process (combinatorial or
exploratory creativity). Essentially, these are all possible concepts within a do-
main theory that have not been made explicit in any form (documented) or are
not known by any agent of the domain’s peer group. Boden’s transformational
creativity is facilitated by a change or transformation of the underlying domain
theory. Such a change would typically be realized by a modiﬁcation or addition
of concepts in a given domain theory.
In Koestler’s framework of creativity the notion of a code is equivalent to our
concept of a domain theory. Like Koestler’s concept of a code, a domain theory
constitutes a relatively ﬁxed system of rules (or concepts) which governs the
processes of creativity.
Unlike Koestler’s model, which incorporates the notion of a matrix, Boden
does not make a distinction between a matrix and a conceptual space. Com-
paring her model with that of Koestler, Boden states: “Matrices appear in my
terminology as conceptual spaces, and diﬀerent forms of bisociation as associa-
tion, analogy, exploration, or transformation.” [6]. This is where Koestler’s model
appears to be more diﬀerentiated. With the notion of a matrix, Koestler puts
the subjective perspective of the entity that engages in creative thought in the
center of his model. Indeed, the matrix notion provides this degree of individu-
ality that appears to be associated with many creative ideas and inventions. In
our model, Koestler’s matrix concept is reﬂected in the concept of a knowledge
base. A knowledge base, like a matrix in Kostler’s framework, is uniquely linked
to a particular reasoner or intelligent agent. Indeed, a knowledge base carries
the characteristics that Koestler associates with his matrices:
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1. There is exactly one knowledge base per agent for each domain.
2. A knowledge base reﬂects the subjective personal, prejudiced and unobjec-
tive views and patterns of thinking and behavior – i.e., a habitual frame of
thought – that provide a unique (albeit biased) perspective of the domain.
Usually, when pondering over a task or problem, only the concepts of a single
knowledge base would be active. This is why Koestler calls his matrices “ha-
bitually” incompatible. This notion does not seem to be reﬂected in Boden’s
model.
3. Because each agent or reasoner incorporates a set of (partially overlapping)
knowledge bases in a highly integrated fashion (with in a single “mind”),
such an agent is equipped with the unequaled potential to discern patterns
of bisociation by bringing together or superimposing multiple knowledge
bases simultaneously. It is this structure that allows an agent to “see” or
perceive a problem, situation or idea simultaneously from diﬀerent frames of
mind (knowledge bases).
Viewing Koestler’s matrix as a knowledge base appears to be a more realistic
model for combinatorial, exploratory and transformational creativity, because it
takes into account the fact that an entity’s (agent) view of the world is normally
limited by the set of knowledge bases it has. One can assume that agents oper-
ating on the basis of Boden’s conceptual spaces are also limited to a subset of
the conceptual space, but this is not so clear in the model of Boden.
Boden argues that bisociation can be incorporated in her model. However,
in the absence of a clear account of the “habitual” dimension (represented by
matrices in Koestler’s framework and by knowledge bases in our model) involved
in bisociation, Boden’s model seems less convincing.
6 Towards a Formal Definition of Bisociation
Based on above considerations we now attempt to provide a formal deﬁnition of
bisociation. In our deﬁnition we employ the following symbols:
Let U denote the universe of discourse, which consists of all concepts.
Let c ∈ U denote a concept in U .
Within the universe of discourse, a problem, idea, situation or event π is associ-
ated with the concepts X ⊂ U . Typically, in a concrete setting, a subset P ⊂ X
is used to describe and reason about π.
Di denotes a domain theory which represents the total knowledge (concepts)
within a domain. Notice that the union of all domain theories represents the
universe of discourse: ∪iDi = U . Furthermore, ∃i, j : Di ∩ Dj = ∅. This means
that many domain theories overlap.
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R denotes a reference system or intelligent agent which possesses exactly one
knowledge base (empty or non-empty) per domain theory Di.
KRi ⊂ Di denotes the knowledge base with respect to the reference system or
intelligent agent R and domain theory Di. Notice, an intelligent agent R has
exactly a single knowledge base KRi (empty or non-empty) per domain theory
i. For example, the knowledge base KRchess deﬁnes the chess knowledge base an
intelligent R has.
KR = ∪iKRi denotes the entire set of knowledge bases incorporated in the refer-
ence system or intelligent agent R.KR represents the total knowledge that R has
in all the domains. For example, an intelligent agent R may possess non-empty
knowledge bases for the domains of chess, biology and religious morality, and an
empty knowledge base for the domain of geometry.
Definition 4 (habitually incompatible knowledge bases). Two
agent-specific knowledge bases KRi and K
R
i (i = j) are said to be habitually in-
compatible if, at a given point in time t, there is no concept c : c ∈ KRi ∧ c ∈ KRj
that is active or perceived simultaneously in KRi and K
R
i .
In other words, an intelligent agent usually employs a single frame of mind
(knowledge base) at a given moment in time to think about a problem. One could
compare this “pedestrian” way of thinking to a “sequential” mode of reasoning
in which a reasoner switches between the matrices (knowledge bases) but only
uses one matrix at the time.
Definition 5 (bisociation). Let π denote a concrete problem, situation or
event and let X ⊂ U denote the concepts associated with π. Further, let KRi and
KRj denote two habitually incompatible agent-specific knowledge bases (i = j).
Bisociation occurs when elements of X are active or perceived simultaneously in
both KRi and K
R
j at a given point in time t.
This refers to the situation where a problem is perceived simultaneously in two
frames of reference or matrices of thought (Figure 1).
For example, at time t the concepts B = {c1, c2, c3}may be active or perceived
simultaneously in KRi and K
R
j . In this case we say that the concepts in A are
bisociated.
Definition 6 (association). Let π denote a concrete problem, situation or
event and let X ⊂ U denote the concepts associated with π. Further, let KRi
denote an agent-specific knowledge base. Association occurs when elements of X
are active or perceived in KRi at time t only.
For example, at time t the concepts A = {c1, c2, c3} may be active in KRi only.
In this case we say that the concepts in A are associated (with each other).
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7 Related Work
The key notion of bisociation is a knowledge structure that is deﬁned on the
concepts originating from multiple domains. Below we brieﬂy look at some of
the literature which is closely related to bisociation. This short review does not
claim to be exhaustive. A more comprehensive literature review should include
areas such as data and information fusion, heterogenous information networks,
interchange of knowledge bases and ontologies, multi-agent systems, hybrid in-
telligent systems, metaphor-based reasoning (conceptual/cognitive metaphors),
conceptual blending, discourse reasoning, and others.
Analogical Reasoning. Analogy is a powerful form of logical inference which
allows to make assertions about an entity or concept, X , based on its similarity
with another entity or concept, Y . For example, we use our knowledge about
water ﬂow to determine properties of electrical circuits. The underlying assump-
tion of analogical reasoning is that if two entities or concepts are similar in some
respects, then they are probably alike in other respects as well. Like inductive
reasoning, which proceeds from the particular to the general, analogical reason-
ing does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion given a true premise. Despite
this similarity with inductive reasoning, analogical reasoning is often viewed as a
form of reasoning which is distinct from inductive reasoning. For instance, Sowa
and Majumdar view analogical reasoning as a two-step reasoning process which
ﬁrst inductively creates a theory from a set of cases, and then deductively gener-
ates an answer to a speciﬁc question or problem on the basis of the theory [32].
In AI, analogical reasoning is often described as a representational or analogical
mapping from a known “source” domain to a (novel) “target” domain [17].
A key element in analogy is the mechanism of selection. Not all commonalities
between two concepts are equally important when we compare the concepts and
make predictions based on similarities. Therefore, a central issue in analogical
mapping is to determine the selection constraints that guide our assessment
of similarity and dissimilarity6. Two broad classes of selection constraints have
been investigated in AI: goal-relevance and structure-relevance. The former is
used to focus analogical mapping on information that is considered critical to
the problem or goal at hand. The latter is used to guide analogical mapping
based on the structural commonalities between two entities or concepts.
6 Similarity should consider the common and distinctive features of the entities under
investigation. For example, let x and y denote two entities, and X and Y the sets
of their characterizing features. Then the similarity, sim(x, y), between x and y is a
function of their common and distinctive features as follows:
sim(x, y) = θf(X ∩ Y )− αg(X \ Y )− βh(Y \X),
where f(X ∩ Y ) expresses the similarity based on common features in x and y,
g(X \ Y ) the dissimilarity based on properties x has but y does not, and h(Y \X)
the dissimilarity based on properties y has but x does not. θ, α and β inﬂuence how
the various components aﬀect the overall score, with θ, α, β ∈ [0, 1].
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Investigating the mechanisms of analogical reasoning in humans, Gentner and
co-workers developed the structure-mapping theory of analogy [13]. The underly-
ing assumptions in the structure-mapping theory are that (a) connected knowl-
edge (concepts) is preferred over independent facts; this assumption is known as
the systematicity principle, and (b) analogical mappings are based on structure-
relevance selection constraints. The structure-mapping theory has been used
to create a computational model called the structure-mapping engine [12]. The
structure-mapping engine can ﬁnd a mapping between the appropriate relations
(between concepts in the considered domains) given a properly constructed rep-
resentation of the domains of interest. Chalmers and co-workers [9] proposed a
diﬀerent approach to explain and model analogical reasoning. They view analog-
ical reasoning as a product of a more general cognitive function called high-level
perception. Morrison et al. interpret high-level perception and the structure-
mapping theory as two aspects of analogy, rather than viewing them as mecha-
nisms on two distinct cognitive organizational levels [27].
Human cognition is continually establishing potential mappings between knowl-
edge domains or contexts. Analogical mapping occurs in a richly interconnected
conceptual space in long-term memory. Attribute/category information plays a
crucial role for the discovery of analogies across the conceptual spaces in long-
term memory. Based on such a model of human memory, the following (simpli-
ﬁed) analogical reasoning processes could be distinguished [14]:
1. Retrieval: In respond to some input case, an analogous or similar case is
retrieved from long-term memory transferred to working memory.
2. Mapping: The two cases (the input case and the retrieved analogous case)
are “aligned” in terms of their analogous features. This enables the identiﬁca-
tion of their common and distinctive properties and the inference of unknown
properties of the input case based on the properties of the retrieved case.
Clearly, one of the problems of the above procedure is that mapping should
already be part of the retrieval process.
Arguably, analogical reasoning is closely related to bisociative reasoning, in
particular its domain-crossing conceptual space (long-term memory) bears the
hallmarks of bisociation. Furthermore, the concept of “richly interconnected con-
ceptual space in long-term memory” is very similar to the assumption in our
formulation of bisociation that there needs to be an overlap of concepts in two
domains to facilitate bisociation.
Bisociation is diﬀerent to analogical reasoning in a number of ways. First,
while analogy may be a mechanism in some forms of biosociation, bisociation
is not about analogy per se. Perceiving a problem simultaneously from the per-
spective of two distinct knowledge bases, does not mean that one views the
entire problem from one knowledge base and then from the other. In a sense,
when bisociation occurs, a fraction of both knowledge bases becomes uniﬁed
into a single knowledge base in the context of the problem at hand. Also, when
one considers some of the examples Koestler describes in the context of humor,
it is clear that some of these do no rely on the concept of analogy [20]. The
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Eureka act described in Figure 2 does not seem to be an example of analogi-
cal reasoning. Second, in contrast to bisociation, analogical reasoning seems to
suggest a similar (analogous) structure of the long-term memory entity that is
retrieved and the input case prompting the retrieval. Bisociation is more akin
to Minsky’s concept of knowledge lines [26], which are a kind of “scaﬀold” at-
tached to the “mental agencies” (facts, concepts, routines, habits, associations)
that were active in creating a certain idea or solving a particular problem in the
past. The knowledge lines later work as a way to re-activate the same structures
in the context of a new problem. Bisociation could be view in similar terms,
except that bisociation explicitly models knowledge lines that cut across knowl-
edge bases embodying domain-speciﬁc mental agencies. Thus, when bisociation
occurs, mental agencies usually (habitually) active in the context of a speciﬁc
domain, are activated together with mental agencies usually active in another
domain. There are also other perhaps more subtle diﬀerence between analogical
reasoning and bisociation that are not discussed here.
Swanson’s Theory. Swanson’s theory [33], also known as to as “Swanson
linking”, is based on the assumption that new knowledge and insight may be dis-
covered by connecting knowledge sources which are thought to be previously un-
related. By “unrelated” Swanson originally meant that there is no co-authorship,
no citation and no oﬃcially stated relationship among the considered knowledge
sources. Swanson coined the phrase “undiscovered public knowledge” to refer to
published knowledge that is eﬀectively hidden in disjoint topical domains be-
cause researchers working in diﬀerent domains are unaware of each others’ work
and scientiﬁc publications. He demonstrated his ideas by discovering new rela-
tionships in the context of biology and other areas. The ﬁeld of literature-related
discovery has emerged from Swanson’s work. It aims at discovering new and
interesting knowledge by associating two or more concepts described in the lit-
erature that have not been linked before [21]. Conceptual biology is another line
of research in this direction – here the idea is to complement empirical biology by
generating testable and falsiﬁable hypotheses from digital biological information
using data mining, text mining and other techniques [4,28]. The methodologies
from literature-related discovery and Swanson’s theory have already been incor-
porated in conceptual biology. In combination with systems biology, automatic
hypothesis generation is being investigated to facilitate automated modeling and
simulation of biological systems [2].
The work by Swanson, literature-related discovery and conceptual biology are
related to bisociative information exploration in their attempt to discover infor-
mation across normally disjoint information spaces. Perhaps one aspect that is
strikingly diﬀerent between the Swanson’s approach and bisociation is the notion
of unrelatedness and topical disjointedness in Swanson. This assumption separates
conceptual spaces on the basis of the originators of knowledge. In our deﬁnition
of bisociation we do not make this distinction. Nevertheless, the Swanson’s the-
ory, while being currently focused on literature as its main source of knowledge, is
interesting in the context of bisociation. Further investigations are needed to de-
termine how bisociation and Swanson’s approach could complement each other.
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Computational Creativity in Science. Computational creativity [7] in art,
music and poetry has been around for some time. A recent development is com-
putational creativity applied to the ﬁelds of science and engineering. For ex-
ample, the aim of the Symposium on Computational Approaches to Creativity
in Science7 (Stanford, US, 2008) was to explore (among other things) (a) the
role creativity plays in various scientiﬁc areas and how ICT-based tools could
contribute to scientiﬁc tasks and processes, (b) the nature of creativity in search
through a problem space and the representation of the search space and the prob-
lem description, (c) the role background knowledge plays in aiding and possibly
interfering with creative processes in science, and (d) the interactions among
scientists that increase creativity and how computational tools could support
these interactions.
There was a wide range of contributions at the Symposium which covered
themes such as the design of discovery systems; inter-disciplinary science and
communication; abstraction, analogy, classiﬁcation; spatial transformations and
comparisons; conceptual simulation; strategies for searching a problem space; the
question of how discovery and creativity diﬀers; knowledge acquisition/reﬁnement
approaches and systems; knowledge-based and knowledge management systems,
and “knowledge trading zones”; and explanations, models and mechanisms of
creative cognition.
Computational creativity in science is a fruitful area and also an area in
which large amounts of data, information and knowledge are readily available in
computer-readable format. Given the specialization of science on the one hand,
and the need for inter-disciplinary science to tackle highly challenging problems
on the other hand, it seems that computational creativity in science oﬀers a
formidable platform to further investigate biosociative information exploration.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
Computational creativity, in particular computational creativity in non-art ap-
plications, is a relatively new computing paradigm [15,8]. For example, computa-
tional creativity in science and engineering means that a scientist or an engineer
cedes part of her control over the discovery or design process to a computer
system that operates with a degree of autonomy, and contributes to the results.
In this article we have outlined a rationale or framework for computational cre-
ativity based on Koestler’s concept of bisociation [20]. The framework presented
here facilitates bisociation by “connecting” the knowledge bases of an intelligent
agent in the context of a concrete problem, situation or event (Figure 1).
Koestler’s treatise and other accounts of bisociation often illustrate bisoci-
ation by either bisociating two common or general knowledge domains, or by
bisociating one more specialized subject matter domain with a commonsense
knowledge domain. For example, the Eureka act (Section 4) bisociates the com-
monsense domain of taking a bath with the domain of geometry. If we want to
reﬂect this kind of structure in a computational creativity solution for non-art
7 http://cll.stanford.edu/symposia/creativity/
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applications, this would mean that we need to develop a knowledge base reﬂect-
ing the application domain and a knowledge base containing commonsense or
general knowledge. A commonsense knowledge base contains the knowledge that
most people possess and use to make inferences about the ordinary world [24].
Information in a commonsense knowledge base includes things like ontologies
of classes and individuals; properties, functions, locations and uses of objects;
locations, duration, preconditions and eﬀects of events; human goals and needs;
and so on. A commonsense knowledge base must be able to facilitate spatial,
event and temporal reasoning. Tasks that require a commonsense knowledge
base are considered “AI-complete” or “AI-hard”, meaning that it would require
a computer to be as intelligent as people to solve the task.
Another approach to bisociation-based computational creativity would require
the bisociating of knowledge bases from diﬀerent non-commonsense domains, for
example, biology and quantum mechanics. Here we have a two-fold challenge:
First, we need to somehow provide some form of interoperability of the in-
volved knowledge bases; this is a topic of active research [10]. Our approach to
integrating the concepts from diﬀerent domains is by creating a heterogeneous
information networks (called BisoNet in this case) from underlying information
sources. The topic of mining of heterogeneous information networks and linked
data has become an area of very active research in recent years [18,5].
Second, when the content of bisociated concepts are presented to the user,
there may be a considerable problem for the user to recognize potentially useful
information from the other domain. For example, a life scientist investigating a
detailed mechanism in relation to gene regulation and nuclear receptors may be
presented with a scientiﬁc article in the ﬁeld of quantum theory that discusses
metric tensors in the context of entanglement entropy. Even if the bisociated
article is potentially useful, the life scientist may not be able to “see” the use-
fulness because he does not have the necessary domain knowledge in ﬁeld of
quantum mechanics.
Another issue – that is shared with all approaches to computational creativ-
ity – of the presented framework concerns the assessment of whether or not a
discovered item, relationship or bisociation is indeed creative in the sense of be-
ing new, surprising and valuable (see Deﬁnition 1). This problem is analogous to
the issue of determining the degree of interestingness or usefulness8 of patterns
discovered by means of data mining or machine learning techniques [25]. Sosa
and Gero [31] argue that creativity is a social construct based on individual-
generative and group-evaluative processes. This suggests that the assessment
of creativeness needs to incorporate social aspects that transcend the within-
individual cognitive dimension. This points to a rather complex challenge for
computational creativity and is something that future studies of computational
bisociation need to take on board.
8 In addition to these, the discovered patterns are usually also required to be non-
trivial, valid, novel and comprehensible. Depending on the technique used and the
application area, an automated assessment of these additional dimensions may also
pose a considerable challenge.
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With the increasing power of ICT and the growing amounts of data, information
and knowledge sources, there is a new wave of eﬀorts aiming to construct comput-
ing solutions that exhibit creative behavior in the context of challenging applica-
tions such as science and engineering [8]. This article presents a framework for
computational creativity based on the concept of bisociation [20]. As a pioneering
eﬀort in this ﬁeld, the BISON project9 has been exploring bisociation networks for
creative information discovery. This article presents some of the rationale, ideas
and concepts we have explored in an eﬀort to formally deﬁne the concept of bioso-
ciation and bisociative information exploration. Clearly, more work is needed to
develop a more comprehensive formal understanding of bisociation and how this
concept can be used to create novel ICT methods and tools.
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